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The Gold Decisions,1 so far as their major holding is concerned, are
more significant from the standpoint of popular interest and the financial
magnitude of the issues involved than from the standpoint of constitutional
law. The earlier cases decided fifty years ago as a result of the Civil War
legislation had narrowed to a comparatively fine point the legal and constitutional issues still remaining open in the private bond cases. Indeed some
lawyers would have said that the exhaustive opinion in the last Legal Tender
Case,2 had foreclosed all the issues, at least so far as issues can be foreclosed
by dicta of our highest Court. It is not going too far to say that on the
precedents and from the standpoint of constitutional law, it would have
been far more revolutionary for the Supreme Court to have decided against
the validity of the recent legislation than as they did decide. The decision
in the private bond cases was distinctly conservative in the sense of following
2
out the logic of the earlier cases. a
No doubt the reason why the reverse has seemed true to a considerable
number of members of the profession, as well as to journalists and publicists,
is because in the field of constitutional law many lawyers often permit
themselves to indulge in a type of reasoning which they are not in the habit
of applying in the field of private law. To take a private law example, it is
an elementary principle, which laymen readily grasp, that in testamentary
dispositions effect should be given to the intention of testators. Lawyers,
however, realize, as laymen usually do not, that, without in any way under-
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taking to deny the general proposition, there are numerous instances where
legally the testator's intention cannot be given effect because of some failure
to comply with the forms of expression which are required in the interest
of protecting the intent of all testators in the long run. The situation is
substantially the same in connection with the equally elementary principle
that contracts should be performed according to their tenor. Here again
the layman does not always perceive that there are many contracts which
the law does not and cannot recognize and enforce, because, in one way or
another, to do so would be inconsistent with that good ordering of society
upon which in the long run the security of all contracts depends. This is
obviously true of gambling contracts, contracts to commit crimes and contracts based upon an immoral consideration. So stated, the qualification of
the general principle would be recognized by every lawyer, but obviously,
if such a qualification is recognized, we can no longer seek to draw any
conclusions directly from a supposedly absolute premise that contracts
ought to be given effect according to their tenor, or to argue, on that ground
alone and without more, that the so-called "gold clause" in private contracts
ought legally to be enforced in spite of contrary legislation. Rather, the
question is whether such a clause is or is not in conflict with a duly exercised
legislative power, existing as part of the machinery of government for the
promotion of the common good.
Every lawyer is familiar with a variety of cases where, in spite of the
obligation of contracts clause, contracts have been held to be constitutionally
invalidated even by a subsequent exercise of legislative power. Leaving
out of account the cases where as in the Mississippi Lottery Case,3 this
subsequent exercise of power has been based on professedly moral grounds,
a familiar type of purely economic regulation which has always been held
to invalidate prior inconsistent contracts is illustrated by the regulation of
public utility rates. Where, in the absence of such regulation, contracts
have been entered into for the purchase of the utility's service, and subsequently rate regulation is introduced, the contracts fall before the regulation.4 Various other types of cases, where the same result was reached, are
cited in Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' majority opinion in the Baltimore &
Ohio Bond Case,5 notably the so-called "free pass" cases.6
From this standpoint, the question involved in the so-called gold clause
cases was simply whether or not the effect of such a clause inserted in con3. Stone v. Mississippi, ioi U. S. 814 (1879).
4. San Antonio v. San Antonio Pub. Serv. Co., 255 U. S. 547 (921)

; Fort Smith Spel-

ter Co. v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 267 U. S. 231 (1925). Cf. also the following, cited in
the Chief Justice's opinion: New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591 (1922) ; United States
v. Village of Hubbard, 266 U. S. 474, 477 (925).
5. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 416, 417 (1935), cited note i,

supra.

6. Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467 (igii).
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tracts is subject to the constitutional power of Congress to regulate the
value of money, or whether, by means of such a clause, the parties can
remove their transactions from the reach of that constitutional power. The
issue was placed clearly in this light in the opinion of the Court in Juilliard
v. Greenman,7 decided more than fifty years ago, and the argument was
shortly afterward elaborated by a distinguished occupant of the Chair of
Constitutional Law at the University of Pennsylvania, the late Judge J.
Clark Hare, in his lectures on the Constitution. This argument had been
previously forged upon the bench of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court8 by
Judge Strong, who afterwards was the spokesman for the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Legal Tender Cases.9 As stated by Judge Hare,
the argument is as follows:
"The federal government has in general no power under the Constitution to vary a contract, or substitute a different mode of performance for that which the contract prescribes . . . Congress could not,

for example, provide that a contract for merchandise might be satisfied
by the delivery of kine .

.

.

But when the act to be performed by

the terms of a contract is the payment of money, the United States
may say how and at what rate the payment shall be made.
"This results, first, from the authority which the Constitution has
conferred upon Congress 'to coin money and regulate the value thereof;'
and next, from the terms of the contract itself, which, in stipulating
for money, must be understood as meaning . . . such money as shall

be lawfully issued by the only power which has authority to issue
money under the Constitution. An agreement to pay in silver dollars
may, accordingly, be fulfilled by a payment in gold, because gold dollars
are by the law of the land, for all the purposes of payment, equivalent
to silver [citing Mervine v. Sailor, 5 Phila. 422, 426 (1864)] . . .
"It results from these considerations that the power of Congress
over the currency is supreme. It has no limit, because none is set to it
in the Constitution . . .
"That the discretion thus conferred on Congress may be exercised
unwisely . . . cannot be denied; but it results from the necessity of

having a means of interchange which shall be so fixed and certain that
its legal value can be ascertained . . . without pausing to examine

what it is intrinsically worth. And as this object cannot be attained
without some common arbiter whose authority is recognized by all,
the sovereign is everywhere entitled to declare what shall be money,
and at what rate it shall be taken . . . Contracts for money must be

presumed to be made with the full knowledge that this power exists and
may be exercised .
"The parties might have placed themselves beyond the reach of
Congress by stipulating for payment in wheat or bullion, . . . and

submitting to the uncertainty, delay, and other inconveniences insep7. Hio U. S. 421 (1884).
8. In Shollenberger v. Brinton, 52 Pa,9 (I866).
9. See note ii, infra.
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arable from such a mode of contracting; among which may be mentioned .
the necessity for calling a jury to assess the damages
. e..If the question of value is left to the government by bargaining
for money, . . . the parties must submit . . . This will be true,
even when a particular kind of money is contracted for, so long as the
contract is for lawful money of the country, because the limitation will
be rejected as inconsistentwith the generaldesign of the contract. That
a particular must yield to a general intent, when both cannot stand
consistently with each other, or with the law, is a well-settled rule in
the construction of grants and contracts; and no repugnancy can be
greater than that which must result from an attempt to unite the different and irreconcilable attributes of money and merchandise, of bullion
and coin .

(862) ]."

.

[citing Shoenberger v. Watts, 5 Phila.

51,

56

10

I have quoted this argunent of Judge Hare's at length, because it seems
so completely to anticipate the position taken by the Supreme Court in the
Baltimore and Ohio Bond Case. In substance it amounts to this, that if the
parties contract not for the delivery of a thing or a commodity, but for
money, as they must do, for example, if they wish their contract to enjoy
the legal incidents of negotiability, then they contract subject to the power
of Congress to fix the value of money; and they cannot remove their contract from the exercise of this power by seeking to give their own definition
of money, because to do so would be repugnant and inconsistent with the
very nature of a contract for money, in the same way, for example, that it
would be inconsistent with the nature of a contract of marriage to provide
that the contract might be voluntarily terminated by either of the parties."
The Supreme Court in its opinion refrained from examining the considerations affecting the economic wisdom or inexpediency of the recent
gold legislation,-it accepted the full and untrammelled power of Congress
to regulate the value of money. No doubt the Court, had it so desired,
could have taken the position, as it has so frequently done in the case of
regulatory legislation, both state and national, in recent years, that an admittedly existing power to be validly exercised must be exercised in a
Io. 2 HARE, AMmcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1889)
1233-1239. (Italics are the
writer's.)
ii. In Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229 (U. S. 1868), and Trebilcock v. Wilson, 12 Wall.
687 (U. S. 1871), together with a number of other cases decided about the same time, the
Court had held that in spite of the Legal Tender Acts contracts to pay in gold coin were enforceable. This was explained in the opinions on the ground that those acts, by providing
that certain classes of debts, e. g., customs duties on imported goods, were not payable in legal
tender notes but only in gold or silver coin, had in effect established a dual systen of two
different currencies, leaving parties free to choose in which they would conduct their transactions. This fact was pointed out both by Judge Hare (op. cit. supra note io,.at 1234, n. i)
and by Chief Justice Hughes in the majority opinion in Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.,
55 Sup. Ct. 407 (1935). The Chief Justice stated that those decisions "did not deal with situa-

tions corresponding to those now presented.

.

.

. The rulings

.

.

. were made when

gold was still in circulation and no act of the Congress prohibiting the enforcement of such
clauses had been passed." At 412.
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manner and within limits which the Court itself chooses to regard as reasonable. In the Gold Cases the Supreme Court has not taken that position, and
instead has followed Marshall's test of simply asking whether the legislation
has a reasonable relation to an end within the admitted power of Congress.
"If," says Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "it is an appropriate means to such
an end, the decisions of the Congress as to the degree of the necessity for
the adoption of that means, is final." 12 The wisdom of this course on the
part of the Court seems obvious. The opposite course would not merely
have required the Court to pass on the merits of competing economic considerations, a task which in many types of cases it can no longer avoid, but
would have gone farther and in substance would have required it to make
a choice between competing governmental policies of the utmost magnitude
and in a field where policy and immediate expediency are far more controlling than any well-settled or accepted economic principles. The Court
does point out, however, the injustice and economic dislocation which Would
result from enforcing the gold clauses in an economy where the debtor's
receipts would come into his hands in the form of new dollars with a low
gold content, while he would still be compelled to make payment of his gold
clause obligations in old dollars with high gold content. 13
12. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 417 (1935).
13. An interesting, and what may possibly become an important, point is raised by the
Court's citing as authority the "free pass" case of Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Mottley, 219
U. S. 467 (1911), and by the reference in the footnotes of the opinion to the two cases of
New York Cent. & Hudson River R. R. v. Gray, 239 U. S.583 (I916), and Calhoun v. MasIn the Gray case the plaintiff had made a map for the defendant
sie, 253 U. S. 170 (92o).
railroad in consideration for which he had agreed to take $iso in cash and $6oo in transportation. After he had received transportation amounting in value to( about $55, the defendant
had refused to furnish further transportation under the contract on the ground that such a
contract had become illegal under the amendment of June 29, i9o6, to the Interstate ComPlaintiff thereupon
merce Act [34 STAT. 584, 585 (1906), 49 U. S. C. A. § i (7)(929)].

brought suit in a state court for the unpaid balance of the agreed price of the map, and the
defendant set up the prohibition of the Act. A judgment for the plaintiff was, on appeal,
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, which said: "There is nothing in the Act to
prevent or relieve a carrier from paying in money for something of value which it had long
before received under a contract valid when made, even though the contract provided for payment in transportation which the passage of the Act rendered thereafter illegal." At 587.
The same result was reached by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in a case where plaintiff
had conveyed to the defendant railroad a right of way through his farm in consideration of
a free pass for life. Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Crowe, 156 Ky. 27 (913). After the
passage of the i9o6 amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, the railroad refused to
honor plaintiff's pass, and he brought this action for damages for the reasonable value of the
land conveyed. A judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed on the ground of the "injustice of
declaring a forfeiture of the unfulfilled contract by a release and discharge of appellant from
all liability thereunder. . . ..At 30. The Crowe case has been mentioned with approval by
the United States Supreme Court in Ortega Co. v. Triay, 260 U. S.1O3 (1922) and has been
followed in the case of Bell v. Kanawha Traction Co., 83 W. Va. 640, 98 S. E. 885 (1919).
An opposite result was reached in Cowley v. Northern Pac. Ry., 68 Wash. 558, 123 Pac. 998
(1912), and in the Missouri case of Pabst Brewing Co. v. Howard, 211 S. W. 720 (Mo.
App. i919). In line with these latter cases is the decision of the Supreme Court in Calhoun
v. Massie, supra. There the plaintiff, an attorney, had made a contract to prosecute certain
claims of the defendant before the Court of Claims and Congress for a fee of fifty per cent.
of the amount which should be collected. After plaintiff's services had been completed, Congress passed an act limiting fees in such cases to twenty per cent. Defendant refused to pay
more than twenty per cent., and plaintiff brought this action in the state court to recover the
balance. A demurrer based on the Act of Congress was sustained, and on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States the judgment was affirmed, the court saying that such
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The significant and interesting thing about the Gold Decisions is not
the holding in the Baltimore & Ohio Bond Case, which follows closely in
the line of the precedents, but is rather the contrast between that case and
the reasoning of the court in Perry v. United States,14 the so-called Liberty
Bond Case. On their facts, the two cases were substantially alike, in that
both were suits by bondholders against the issuer of the bonds, seeking to
collect the full gold value of the obligation in terms of present dollars. The
difference was simply that in the one case the debtor was a private corporation, in the other it was the United States government. A comparison of
the opinions discloses, however, a completely different method of approach
on the part of the Court. In the case of the private bonds, the Court approached the issue from the standpoint of the proposition that when parties
action by Congress might reasonably have been contemplated by the parties at the time of
making of the contract, and assent thereto was accordingly an implied term. "Here, unlike
N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Gray, 239 U. S. 583, 587, a performance of a substitute for the
obligation undertaken and later prohibited by the statute is impossible, because the act forbids the collection or receipt of any compensation in excess of twenty per cent." At 176.
Decisions like that in Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 5o2 (1923) are not
directly applicable, since they involved suits against the government and held that where governmental action renders illegal the completion of a contract which one party has already
wholly or in part performed, the government is not liable for the resulting loss to that party.
Indirectly the decision is in point because it assumed that the plaintiff had suffered a loss
which he could not recover from the other party to the contract, and because the opinion
cited as authority the numerous English cases so holding. The doctrine of the group of decisions represented by the Gray and Crowe cases constitutes an effort, supported by Williston
on equitable grounds [CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1922) §§ 1972, 1976], to get away from the traditional doctrine of quasi-contracts that where a contract has been performed irf whole or in
part on one side and performance on the other becomes impossible, there can be no recovery
for the value of what has been performed. Jordan v. McCammon, 56 Ohio St. 79o, rev'g McCammon v. Peck, 3 Ohio Dec. 232 (1895) ; Pinkham v. Libbey, 93 Me. 575, 45 Atl. 823 (goo),
and numerous English cases, including those cited in Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,
supra. Compare, for example, Tweedie Trading Co. v. McDonald Co., 114 Fed. 985 (902)
with Fordham v. Cooper, 70 Colo. 529, 202 Pac. io86 (i92i), and McGillycuddy v. Los Verjels Land & Water Co., 213 Cal. 145, 2 P. (2d) i9 (ig3i). In the Tweedie case, plaintiff
had paid defendant a sum of money for the transportation of laborers from Barbadoes to
Panama, but before the transportation was performed, it became impossible to carry out the
contract because of the issue of a government regulation forbidding the exportation of laborers. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover the amount paid. On the other hand, in Fordham v. Cooper, where a tenant performed labor upon a dwelling house belonging to his landlord in consideration of deductions to be made from his future rent, and afterward the health
authorities condemned the premises so that the tenant could no longer occupy them, it was
held that the tenant could recover the reasonable value of his labor. So also in the McGillycuddy case, where the plaintiff contracted with the board of directors of the defendant corporation to serve as general manager of the corporation and agreed to take his compensation
in new stock of the corporation, and subsequently the state corporation commission refused
to permit the corporation to issue the stock, it was held that the plaintiff could recover the
reasonable value of his services. Whatever may be thought of the quasi-contractual
cases generally,. it would certainly seem provocative of litigation and unsettling to the
stability of transactions to hold that a subsequent exercise of the police power, while
effective to terminate prior contracts, operates to give rise to equitable actions to readjust
the position of the parties. The decision in the Baltimore and Ohio Bond Case would have
little beneficial economic effect if, while holding that the bondholder could not recover the
present value of the gold dollars promised him by the contract, he could still recover in an
equitable action the difference in present value between what he gave and what, under the
new legislation, it is lawful for him to receive. It does not seem likely that the courts will
permit themselves to be drawn into any such calculus of relative values. In this connection
the passage above quoted from the opinion in Calhoun v. Massie would seem to leave the
Court a clear way out.
14. 55 Sup. Ct. 432 (1935).
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contract for money they do so in contemplation of and subject to the right
of Congress to regulate the currency. In the Liberty Bond Case, on the
other hand, the Court commenced by considering what it called "the binding
quality of the obligation" of the debtor, i. e., the government. Admitting,
as before, the full power of Congress to determine the currency of the
country and therefore to regulate the value of money, the Court at once
departed from this method of approach and made nothing of the fact that
government bonds, like private obligations, are contracts to pay in money.
Instead, it emphasized the fact that they are obligations to pay money of a
particular standard and having a particular gold content, and then proceeded to argue that any change in the monetary system by Congress which
would permit the government to pay in money of a different standard and
having a lower gold content would amount to repudiation of the obligation.
In other words, the emphasis of the Court shifted from regarding an obligation as an obligation to pay in money to considering an obligation as one to
pay a particular kind of money. From this standpoint, payment in a kind
of money having a lower gold content was represented in strong language
as repudiation.
The reason for this shift in the Court's position where government
bonds were concerned seemed to be a fear that a different holding would
open the door to an admission of the government's power to scale down
arbitrarily the face amount of its debts. Thus the Court said:
"If the terms of the government's bond as to the standard of payment can be repudiated, it inevitably follows that the obligation as to
the amount to be paid may also be repudiated." '"
It does not seem, however, that such is the necessary conclusion. When
Congress alters the standard of the currency, then to permit the government
to pay in currency of the new standard is simply to place it on a par with all
other debtors. It can pay in currency of the reduced standard simply because all other debtors have the same privilege. This is obviously a very
different thing from permitting the government to scale down the face
amount of its obligations. If it were permitted to take the latter course, it
could do so for its own benefit exclusively and without the nation-wide
readjustments flowing from an alteration in the currency system. It could,
in other words, derive a special discriminatory advantage for itself at the
expense of its own creditors, without reference to any uniform general
system of currency and credit revision. To prohibit such discriminatory
action as repudiation may well be sound; but it does not in any sense require,
as the Court suggests in the passage quoted, that the government, as one
debtor among many, should be prohibited from maintaining itself on a par
with other debtors and should instead be compelled to assume a position
1S. Id. at 435.
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of special and peculiar disadvantage, as the Court's argument requires it
to do.
If in fact the government, because it is the government, is thus incapacitated, as the Court holds, from taking advantage of a revaluation, of
currency in the same way as other debtors, the results are serious from both
a logical and a practical point of view. From a logical point of view, it
means substantially that the money in which government obligations are
to be paid is a different kind of money from the new currency in which
private obligations may legally be discharged, and which, the court admitted, was intended to provide a single and uniform monetary system.
There is thus established precisely such a dual system of two currencies
existing side by side as the Court in the Baltimore and Ohio Case held that
Congress might constitutionally reject in favor of a single uniform system,
and upon the rejection of which the Court based its distinction of that case
from Bronson v. Rodes.
But the practical consequences of the Court's position are even more
serious. In the Baltimore and Ohio Case the Court pointed out, as already
indicated, that the receipts of private debtors come into their hands in the
form of the new currency and that it would therefore be onerous in the
extreme to compel payment in the old currency of higher standard. Precisely the same argument applies to the government. Logically applied, it
would amount in plain figures to increasing by about three-fourths the
principal amount of the national debt and the annual debt service in the
same proportion. Possibly such a result might be welcomed as a potential
deterrent to currency devaluation; but in view of the Court's frank recognition in the Baltimore and Ohio Case of the plenary power of Congress to
regulate the value of money in its discretion, it would hardly seem that such
a consideration should influence the judicial result.
It would not have been impossible for the Court to have found ways
for the government as a debtor to preserve its parity of position with other
debtors without, at the same time, opening the door to a special repudiation
of its own obligations. One way, among others, which might be suggested
would have been to recognize frankly the distinction between the essentially
private-law position of government as a business entity when borrowing
and lending money like private business entities, and on the other hand its
public sovereign capacity which it exercises when it undertakes to legislate
for the general good by regulating the currency. Such a distinction would
permit the sovereign power to deal with governmental debts on the same
footing as other debts, while still prevented from preferring itself specially
if that was thought undesirable. This distinction exists in all civil law
countries and, while it has never been fully recognized in the common law,
so that its acceptance might possibly open the door to a revision of some of
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our conceptions, we already have the basis of it well established in our
recognized distinction between the governmental and nongovernmental functions of public bodies, and the conception, if applied merely by way of
analogy, need not necessarily be extended to the point of inconvenience.
In not choosing to take this or some similar course, and in holding the
government without power to alter the monetary standard in which its own
obligations are payable, the Court was, however, unwilling apparently to
bring about the tremendous increase in the fiscal burdens of the nation which
the logic of its position might be thought to entail. It therefore sought
and found another and different way of escape from the difficulty. This
was by holding that in spite of the legal obligation of the government to
pay its bonds in currency of the old standard, nevertheless the plaintiff in
the case at bar had not shown that the failure to perform the obligation had
resulted in any actual damages entitling him to recover. The case in other
words was one of injuria absque damno. This result was reached on the
ground that in view of the legislation withdrawing gold coin from circulation and the consequent absence of a free domestic market for gold, the
plaintiff's damage did not consist in the monetary value of the excess gold
of which he was deprived by the government's refusal to honor its obligation, but only in such loss as he might have sustained through the lower
purchasing power in the domestic market of the new dollar as compared
with the old. The court held that he had neither pleaded nor proved such
loss of purchasing power, saying:
"Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that in relation
to buying power he has sustained any loss whatever. On the contrary,
in view of the adjustment of the internal economy to the single measure
of value as established by the legislation of the Congress, and the
universal availability and use throughout the country of the legal tender
currency in meeting all engagements, the payment to the plaintiff of
the amount which he demands would appear to constitute, not a recoupment of loss in any proper sense, but an unjustified enrichment." 16
This language would appear to place the denial of recovery on no
broader or more general ground than defect of proof by Mr. Perry. The
door is thus left open to future suits in which plaintiffs may attempt to show
that the rise in prices which has been proceeding since the gold legislation
and may be expected to proceed still farther has resulted in that loss of
buying power which the court appears to recognize as constituting actual
damage. Whatever the fate of such suits may be, it is not to be expected
that the ingenuity of the profession will ignore so promising an opening
for litigation.
There is a further field of possible litigation opened by the doctrine
of actual damages which the court has laid down. This is in connection
16. Id. at 438.
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with the use of dollars for the purchase of foreign exchange. The reduction in the gold content of the dollar, however indirect its effect on internal
purchasing power in the domestic markets, had a very direct and immediate
effect in increasing the number of dollars needed to purchase a given amount
of any foreign currency. The Court in considering the Perry Case declined
to recognize an element of damage in the fact that more new dollars were
needed to buy gold for export because, as it pointed out, exports of gold
had been placed under license, and therefore presumably Mr. Perry might
have been unable to export the gold even if he had bought it. But this
would not be true, of course, of the purchase of foreign exchange to make
settlements or purchases abroad. Here the bond-owner, by being compelled
to take payment of his principal or interest in the new dollars which he
expected to exchange for foreign currency, is limited to receiving a smaller
amount of such currency than would be the case if he received the larger
number of new dollars to which the gold content of the old dollars due him
would have entitled him. There is to this extent actual damage and therefore at least ground for arguing that on the Court's theory he would be
entitled to a recovery.
The issue of such attempts to apply in actual litigation the views suggested by the court is uncertain, and will no doubt have to be worked out
from case to case, unless Congress should take refuge, as a flood of litigation might very well impel it to do, in the more or less unpalatable course
of falling back on the immunity of the sovereign and closing the Court of
Claims to cases of this sort. There is however one class of claims as to
which even this course would not be effective, and which are directly invited by the unequivocal holding of the Supreme Court that the United
States is under a legal duty to pay its obligations in dollars of the standard
provided in their tenor. I refer to the claims of foreign nationals who are
holders of such bonds.
The Court, after stating that "The right to make binding obligations
is a competence attaching to sovereignty," 17 continues as follows:
"This is recognized in the field of international engagements. Although
there may be no judicial procedure by which such contracts may be
enforced in the absence of the consent of the sovereignty to be sued,
the engagement validly made by a sovereign state is not without legal
force, as readily appears if the jurisdiction to entertain a controversy
with respect to the performance of the engagement is conferred upon
an international tribunal." 18
While admittedly there is no international tribunal which could take
jurisdiction over such a controversy without our consent, nevertheless the
admission of the validity of the claim by our highest court lays the strongest
17. Id. at 436.

18. Id. at 412, n. 3.
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possible basis for its presentation against the United States through diplomatic channels by foreign countries on behalf of their nationals who hold
our bonds. While we are not subject to the jurisdiction of any international
tribunal, we are still in diplomatic relations with other countries, and so
long as such relations exist these countries are entitled to claim their lawful
rights through diplomatic channels even though no legal procedure exists
for enforcing them. Whether or not the gold clause in our government
bonds constitutes under international law an obligation superior to the
authority of Congress to regulate the currency is still an open question, as
it was an open question under our municipal law before the decision of the
Perry Case. The decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice,"9 in the case of the Serbian and Brazilian bonds, which are cited in
Mr. Justice McReynolds' dissenting opinion, are by no means conclusive,
because of important differences in essential facts. Although the question
under international law would thus seem to be open, there is certainly a
difficulty thrown in the way of our appealing to it by the broad and seemingly unequivocal language with reference to our national law in the Perry
decision. The foreign holders can claim as entitled under our own law,
and there is no such obstacle in the matter of proof of damages as may
serve to bar our own citizens, because the decline of the exchange value of
the dollar affords a readily computable measure.
It is the considerations that I have just been advancing which lend
special point and importance to the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in
the Perry Case, with a few excerpts from which I shall conclude:
it is unnecessary, and I think undesirable, for the Court to
undertake to say that the obligation of the gold clause in government
bonds is greater than in the bonds of private individuals, or that in some
situation not described, and in some manner and in some measure undefined, it has imposed restrictions upon the future exercise of the
power to regulate the currency. .

.

. I therefore do not join in so

much of the opinion as may be taken to suggest that the exercise of
the sovereign power to borrow money on credit, which does not override the sovereign immunity from suit, may nevertheless preclude or
impede the exercise of another sovereign power, to regulate the value
of money; or to suggest that, although there is and can be no present
cause of action upon the repudiated gold clause, its obligation is nevertheless, in some manner and to some extent not stated, superior to the
power to regulate the currency which we now hold to be superior to the
obligation of the bonds." 20
1g. Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A, Nos. 20/2I
In both these cases the debtor country issued, specifically for sale abroad, obligations
payable not in its own currency but in the currency of a particular foreign country, i. e., the
French franc. The terms of the obligation specified the gold franc. The issue was whether,
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when France altered the value of the franc, the amount of the obligations fluctuated correspondingly. Obviously this seems a different situation .from the issuance domestically of ob-

ligations of a country in its own currency over which it has sovereign control.
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